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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
This brief in support of respondents is filed on
behalf of amici curiae Tobacco Control Legal
Consortium, AARP, and Public Justice.
The Tobacco Control Legal Consortium (TCLC) is a
national network of legal centers providing technical
assistance to public officials, health professionals and
advocates in addressing legal issues related to tobacco
and health, and supporting public policies that will
reduce the harm caused by tobacco use in the United
States. TCLC is supported by national advocacy
organizations, voluntary health organizations and
others, and it files legal briefs as amicus curiae in
cases in which its experience and expertise may assist
courts in resolving tobacco-related issues of national
significance, including Philip Morris v. Williams, 127
S. Ct. 1057 (2007), and Rowe v. N.H. Motor. Transp.
Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization with
nearly forty million members. AARP works to foster
the health and economic security of individuals as they
age by improving the health care system and
promoting healthy behaviors.    Tobacco use is
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, no counsel for a party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made
a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief. No person other than amici
curiae, their members, or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission. The parties
have consented to the filing of this brief.
recognized by most as one of the top health indicators
related to disease prevention and health promotion. As
the largest membership organization representing the
interests of people 50 and over, ,~kRP has also long
supported laws and public policies designed to protect
and preserve the availability of legal redress when
people are harmed in tlhe marketplace.
Public Justice is a national public interest law firm
dedicated to pursuing justice for tlhe victims of
corporate and governmental abuses. Through
involvement in precedent-setting and socially
significant litigation, Public Justice seeks to ensure
that tort law fully serves its dual purposes --
compensating those injured by wrongful conduct and
deterring similar conduct in the future. Public Justice
is gravely concerned that, if the tort system is closed to
innocent victims of petitioners’ fraudulent
misrepresentations through application of the
preemption doctrine in this case, neither of these
purposes will be served.
Amici have a signifi~cant interest in ~his case. More
than 45 million Americans smoke cigarettes, and the
vast majority of them    over 80 percent    smoke
"light" or "ultra light" cigarettes, united States v.
Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 508 (D.D.C. 2006),
appeal pending, No. 06-5267 et al. (D.C. Cir.). More
than half of these smokers believe, because Philip
Morris and other tobacco companies :repeatedly told
them so, that "light" cigarettes are less dangerous than
regular cigarettes and that switching to "light"
cigarettes is an alternative to quitting. Id. at 467-68,
488-92, 513-29, 860. They are wrong. The scientific
evidence long concealed by petitioner Philip Morris
is unequivocal: "light" cigarettes are no less deadly
than regular cigarettes and offer no health benefit
whatsoever.
This case is important because it presents two
questions that will determine whether consumers
victimized by the deliberate misrepresentations,
concealment and fraud committed by Philip Morris and
other cigarette companies may seek redress. The first
is whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. ("Labeling
Act"), preempts state law claims challenging Philip
Morris’ use of false and deceptive means to persuade
smokers that "light" cigarettes are less dangerous than
other cigarettes. As amici demonstrate below, and as
this Court held in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S.
504, 529 (1992) (plurality), there is no indication in the
Labeling Act that Congress intended it to shield
cigarette companies from fraud claims based on
violation of state law duties not to deceive.
Equally insubstantial is Philip Morris’ implied
preemption argument, which claims that the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) "authorized" the use of
health descriptors like "light" and that the FTC has a
"low tar" policy that would be undermined were Philip
Morris to be held liable for its fraud under state law.
The short answer is that Philip Morris’ arguments are
pure smoke: The FTC never authorized Philip Morris’
use of "light" or "low tar" as descriptors and does not
have and never has had a "low tar" policy. There is
4thus no federal "policy" placed at risk by state law
claims and no basis for a finding of preemption.
Philip Morris’ argument is wrong for another
reason important to amici. The FTC has sweeping,
nation-wide jurisdiction over unfair and deceptive
trade practices, but ordinarily the FTC’s exercise of
authority does not preempt state consumer protection
claims. Consumer protection is one area in which
federal and state law ihave long and successfully co-
existed. To ensure that state authority in consumer
protection matters is not displaced wi~:hout notice to
the states and careful deliberation, Congress has
directed the FTC to follow certain procedures to
exercise its preemptive power procedures the FTC
did not employ here. A finding of FTC preemption in
this case would not only be at odds with the FTC’s
denial that it authorized the use of health descriptors
or has a ’~low tar" policy, but also could seriously
undermine the ability of states to enibrce their own
consumer protection and anti-fraud statutes
concurrently with FTC enforcement efforts.
STATEMENT
1. The Introduction of"Light" and "Low Tar"
Cigarettes.
By the early 1950s, evidence began to mount
linking cigarette smoking with lung cancer. In 1964,
the United States Surgeon General issued his Report
on Smoking and Health, announcing that a scientific
consensus had been reached that cigarette smoking
5causes diseases and death. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
513. Even before the public began to understand the
link between smoking and disease, Philip Morris and
other cigarette companies "knowingly and
intentionally engaged in a scheme to defraud smokers,
for the purpose .of financial gain, by making false and
fraudulent statements, representations and promises"
to counteract that understanding. United States v.
Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
To capitalize on the public’s growing apprehension
about the link between cigarettes and lung cancer,
Philip Morris and other companies developed "light"
cigarettes, including Marlboro Lights. Philip Morris
knew that, notwithstanding the descriptor "light,"
Marlboro Lights provided no safety benefit for
smokers. Philip Morris’ own research showed that
smokers receive comparable quantities of tar and
nicotine regardless of the kind of cigarette they smoke.
Nonetheless, Marlboro Lights were branded "Light"
and marketed to foster the illusion that they represent
an acceptable alternative to quitting, or at least a step
towards decreasing smokers’ health-risks and
dependence on cigarettes. Id. at 477-81; 504-06.
The introduction and marketing of Marlboro Lights
was integral to Philip Morris’ scheme to dissuade
smokers from quitting. The district court in United
States v. Philip Morris found:
As their internal documents reveal, Defendants
engaged in massive, sustained, and highly
sophisticated marketing and promotional
6campaigns to portray their light brands as less
harmful than regular cigarettes, and thus an
alternative to quitting, while at the same time
carefully avoiding any admission that their full-
flavor cigarettes were harmful to smokers’
health. Defendants knew that by providing
worried smokers with health reassurance, they
could keep them buying and smoking cigarettes.
449 F. Supp. 2d at 860. Philip Morris’ internal
documents reflect thi[s strategy. One company
memorandum explains that the company’s goal was to
introduce a "socially acceptable cigarette" that would
be "a welcomed alternative to quitting, and might
attract new smokers who would not otherwise choose
to become product users." Id. at 490.2
2 In mid-1966, the FTC decided to standardize tar
and nicotine content measurements and informed the
cigarette companies that factual representations about tar
and nicotine content would not be deemed deceptive so long
as they (1) were based on the "Cambridge Filter Method" (a
testing method that used[ a smoking machine to determine
tar and nicotine content); and (2) made no claims that the
levels of tar and nicotine reduced health hazards. See FTC
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 778 F.2d 35, 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
Philip Morris engineered Marlboro Lights to deliver to
smokers the same tar and nicotine as other cigarettes,
while delivering lower levels when measured by a smoking
machine. The evidence on this point is overwhelming.
United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 461-68;
(continued...)
7These marketing efforts have been remarkably
successful. A majority of "light" cigarette smokers
believe that "light" cigarettes are "better for your
health" than regular cigarettes. Id. at 524-25, 860.
Not surprisingly, the market share for "light"
cigarettes rose from 2% in 1967 to 81% of cigarette
sales in 1998. Id. at 508; see also id. at 475-561.
2. Proceedings Below.
This action was brought by Stephanie Good and
other long-time Marlboro Light smokers on their own
behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated
2(...continued)
see also id. at 462 (quoting a 1967 memorandum by a Philip
Morris scientist saying "the smoker, is, thus, apparently
defeating the purpose of dilution to give him less smoke per
puff. He is certainly not performing like the standard
smoking machine; and to this extent the smoking machine
data appears to be erroneous and misleading."); see also id:
at 465-66 (discussing a 1975 Philip Morris study showing
that smokers took "larger puffs" on Marlboro Lights than
conventional Marlboro cigarettes and thus "did not achieve
any reduction in smoke intake by smoking a cigarette
(Marlboro Lights) normally considered lower in delivery").
Despite this, Philip Morris complained to the FTC that the
Cambridge Filter Method "may be deceptive because a
smoker may assume his cigarette is delivering the amount
of’tar’ and nicotine reported by the FTC when in fact it will
be delivering much less, the way he smokes."). Id. at 501.
smokers in Maine.3 Ms. Good and her co-plaintiffs
alleged that they had smoked Marlboro Lights for at
least fifteen years and that Philip Morris had engaged
in unfair and deceptive practices in the design,
manufacture, promotion and marketing of Marlboro
Lights. The plaintiffs claimed that Philiip Morris called
and promoted Marlboro Lights as "light" and "low tar
and nicotine" cigarettes to persuade consumers
especially those worried about the health risks of
smoking that Marlboro Lights are less dangerous
than regular, or "full flavor," cigarettes. Philip Morris
engaged in these efforts even though it knew, but
concealed, evidence showing that Marlboro Lights
deliver the same levels of tar and nico’~ine to smokers
as do the company’s regular cigarettes and thus pose
no less risk to health..
Ms. Good and her co-plaintiffs contended that
Philip Morris’ misrepresentations violated the Maine
Unfair Trade Practices Act, which "declare [s] unlawful"
any "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce." Me. Revo Stat. Ann. tit. 5,
§ 208(1). The essence of plaintiffs’ claim is that by
portraying Marlboro Lights as less harmful than other
cigarettes, while at the same time concealing evidence
that Marlboro Lights are not less harmful, Philip
Morris breached its state law duty to not knowingly
deceive consumers about a material fact. The Maine
a This discussion is drawn from the lower courts’
opinions in these cases. See Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 436
F. Supp. 2d 132, 133-39~, 144-45 & n.21 (D. Me. 2006), rev’d,
501 F. 3d 29, 30-36 (1st Cir. 2007).
9statute does not purport to regulate smoking and
health; to the contrary, it is a general anti-fraud,
consumer protection statute, just like the Federal
Trade Commission Act, on which it is modeled. Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I)).
Nonetheless, the district court found plaintiffs’
claims expressly preempted by Section 1334(b) of the
Labeling Act, which provides that "[n]o requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions
of this Act." The district court concluded that, under
its reading of Cipollone, plaintiffs’ claims should be
characterized as failure to warn or "warning
neutralization" claims, which are preempted by the
Labeling Act. See 436 F. Supp. 2d at 151. The court
did not reach Philip Morris’ implied preemption
argument.
The First Circuit reversed. The court first rejected
Philip Morris’ express preemption argument. Under
Cipollone, the question is whether "the legal duty" that
gives rise to the claim is "based on smoking and
health." 501 F.3d at 38 (quoting 504 U.S. at 524
(plurality)). The court held that, because the
fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment claims
at issue in this case are based on a general duty not to
deceive imposed by Maine law, and not a law targeting
the marketing of cigarettes, they are not preempted by
the Labeling Act. Id. at 38-39.
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The court next rejected Philip Morris’ implied
preemption defense, which rested on wlhat the company
characterized as the FTC’s "authorization" of its use of
"Light" as a descrip~G,r and the "FTC’s low-tar policy"
favoring the promotion of light cigarettes. After an
exhaustive review of the FTC’s statements, the court
held that it could not "discern a coherent federal policy
on low-tar claims," let alone a policy that would be
threatened by respondents’ state law claims. 501 F.3d
at 55.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici file this brief to emphasize a point that may
not stand out in respondents’ more comprehensive
treatment of the issues before the Court namely,
that there is no hint in either the Labeling Act or in
the FTC’s on-again, off-again actions regarding
disclosure of cigarettes’ tar and nicotine content that
Congress or the FTC intended to "insl~late [cigarette]
manufacturers from longstanding rules governing
fraud." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29.
Make no mistake, this case is about fraud. As the
United States argued in its civil racketeering action
against Philip Morris and other cigarette companies,
"marketing of’light’ cigarettes is a principal weapon in
their attempts to mislead the public regarding the
health risks of smoking." Brief for the United States in
United States v. Philip Morris, et al., No. 06-5267, et
al., at 146 (D.C. Cir. fi].ed Nov. 19, 2007). The question
in this case is whether petitioners are shielded from.
state anti-fraud litigation because Congress or the FTC
11
preempted fraud claims arising from statements made
to deceive smokers that "light" cigarettes are less
deadly than regular cigarettes. The answer to that
question is "no."
To be sure, this Court in Cipollone held that the
Labeling Act preempts state law claims that would
require cigarette companies to add or modify the
warnings prescribed by Congress. But Cipollone also
held that the Labeling Act does not preempt claims
arising from false statements made in advertising,
press statements, government submissions and other
channels of communication, where the claim is based
on the duty not to deceive. 505 U.S. at 528, 529
(plurality). Thus, allegations that a cigarette company
deliberately misrepresented and concealed material
facts in violation of a state anti-fraud statute -- the
precise allegations at issue here -- are not preempted.
Id. As the plurality saw it, Congress did not intend the
Labeling Act "to insulate cigarette manufacturers from
longstanding rules governing fraud." Id. Such claims
are not predicated on a duty "based on smoking and
health," but on a general duty imposed by state law --
i.e., the duty not to deceive. Id. at 528-89. Petitioners’
theory should be rejected because it would, contrary to
Congress’ intent, effectively insulate cigarette
manufacturers from rules governing fraud, no matter
how egregious the manufacturers’ false statements or
fraudulent concealment.
Equally insubstantial is petitioners’ argument that
the FTC "authorized" tobacco companies to use "Light"
as a product descriptor (Marlboro Lights), and that
12
permitting respondents’ claims to go forward "would
impede the FTC’s low-tar policy." Br. at 46. The
signal defect in petitioners’ argument is that the FTC
itself disclaims the existence of any authorization or
policy, let alone a policy that justifies ousting
longstanding state anti-fraud laws.. Even Philip
Morris has acknowle,dged elsewhere that there is no
such policy. In 2002.~ Philip Morris filed a petition with
the FTC urging the agency "to promulgate rules
governing.., the use of descriptors such as ’light’ and
’ultra light."’ See Good, 501 F.3d at 56 n.29. Philip
Morris’ petition, of course, would have been
superfluous had the FTC previously "authorized" the
use of these descriptors.
Just as fundamentally, the hodge-podge of FTC
actions cited by the Philip Morris as evidence of a
federal policy on light cigarettes could not have the
sweeping preemptive effect it claims. Because the
FTC’s mission of protecting consumers against unfair
and deceptive advertising practice overlaps with state
law, Congress established regulatory procedures for
the FTC to follow when it intends to take preemptive
action. See, e.g., American Financia,l Servs. Ass’n v.
FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 939-90 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The FTC
did not avail itself of those procedures here, which
further confirms the FTC’s position that it did not act
to preempt state law. For these reasons as well,
petitioners’ implied preemption argument should be
rejected.
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ARGUMENT
I. The Labeling Act Does Not Preempt
Respondents’ Claims.
Philip Morris’ central argument is that plaintiffs’
fraud claims are expressly preempted by the Labeling
Act. Philip Morris thus asks this Court to engage in
legal alchemy -- i.e., to transform the Labeling Act, a
statute designed to inform the public of the health
risks of smoking, into an instrument of deception.
Philip Morris’ argument cannot be reconciled with this
Court’s holding in Cipollone or with the plain text of
the Labeling Act.4
A. Cipollone Forecloses Petitioners’ Express
Preemption Claim.
Dissatisfied with this Court’s ruling in Cipollone,
Philip Morris and its amici urge the Court either to
disregard its holding or to abandon it altogether.
4 The Labeling Act’s preemption provision states that
"[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Those provisions require
that packages of cigarettes and their advertisements bear
one of a rotating series of warnings about the adverse
health effects of smoking. Id. § 1333(a), (c). The Act also
provides that no additional "statemen~ relating to smoking
and health.., shall be required on any cigarette package."
Id. § 1334(a).
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Indeed, Philip Morris does not even begin its
discussion of Cipollone until page 37 of its brief.
Notwithstanding Cipollone’s contrary ruling, Philip
Morris argues that the phrase "based on smoking and
health" should be :read at the highest level of
generality imaginable one that renders it virtually
limitless    and then contends that the preemptive
scope of the Labeling Act should be construed to be
equally limitless. Petitioners then argue that the Act
bars any state law claim that chal:[enges cigarette
companies for making fraudulent claims about
cigarettes that have anything to do with health. Br. at
23-25. There is no principle that li~nits petitioners’
argument.5
Petitioners’ reading of the Labeling Act was
rejected by a solid majority of this Court in Cipollone~.
To be sure, the plurality opinion by ,Justice Stevens,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and O’Connor, ruled that some, but by no means all,
state law claims are preempted by the Act. 505 U.S. at
524-30. The plurality concluded that state law claims
that would require cigarette companies to add or
~ Nor is Philip Morris’ reading of’ the Labeling Act
consistent with the way it, and other cigarette companies,
understood it when it was enacted, or even during the first
twenty years the Labeling Act was on the books. As the
Court observed in Cipoi!lone, even though there was a "great
deal of litigation relating to cigarette use beginning in the
1950s," it was not until Cipollone that the companies
"raised [§ 1334(b)] as a pre-emption defense." 505 U.S. at
520 n.17.
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modify the warnings prescribed by Congress were
preempted. Accordingly, failure to warn claims, and
claims alleging that cigarette companies had engaged
in advertising to "neutralize" the warnings, were
found to be preempted. Id. at 524-26.~
But on the question presented here    namely,
whether the Labeling Act preempts state law
fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment claims
seven Justices endorsed the view that these claims
are not "based on smoking and health" and are
therefore not preempted. Indeed, on this issue, the
label "plurality" is something of a misnomer. Justice
Blackmun’s separate opinion, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Souter, maintained that the Labeling Act
did not preempt any State law damages claims; it
would have allowed all of Cipollone’s claims to proceed.
505 U.S. at 542. Thus, contrary to Philip Morris’
suggestion that the division in Cipollone somehow
supports its position, Br. at 44, there was in fact a
solid, seven Justice majority of the Cipollone Court
taking the view that, at the very least, Congress in the
Labeling Act did not intend to preempt fraudulent
concealment and advertising claims based on general
state law requirements.
The plurality’s opinion explains why Congress made
that judgment. According to the plurality, the "central
inquiry" in determining whether a state law claim is
~ On this issue, the opinion was joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, who otherwise dissented. 505 U.S. at
550.
16
preempted is "whether the legal dusty that is the
predicate of the common-law damages action
constitutes a ’requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health’.., g~ving that cl[ause a fair but
narrow reading." 505 U.S. at 523-24. Because the
Cipollone petitioner alleged that tobacco companies
had made false representations of material fact or
concealed material facts concerning the health
consequences of smoking, see id. at 510,, 528, his claims
of fraudulent misrepresentation could have been
viewed as falling withiin the text of Section 1334(b), at
least if as broadly construed as Philip Morris urges.
The plurality rejected that reading of Section 1334(b),
finding "the phrase ’based on smoking and health’
fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the
more general duty not 1;o make fraudulent statements."
505 U.S. at 529. Accordingly, the plurality ruled that
the fraudulent misrepresentation claims were not
preempted because they were "predicated not on a duty
’based on smoking and health’ but rather on a more
general obligation ---the duty not to deceive." Id. at
’ 528-29.
The plurality found that interpretation of Section
1334(b) appropriate for a number of reasons: (1) there
was no evidence that Congress intended to insulate
cigarette manufacturers from longstanding rules
governing fraud; (2) the legislative history showed that
Congress intended for the term ’%ased on smoking and
health" to be constr~ed narrowly and not to reach.
traditional exercises of states’ police ]power; (3) state
law prohibitions against fraud do not create "diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing" standards that would
17
conflict with the Labeling Act’s uniformity goal; and (4)
holding the claims preempted would conflict with the
background presumption against preemption. Id. at
529 & nn.26, 27; see also id. at 530.
Applying the teachings of Cipollone here, plaintiffs’
claims are not preempted. Plaintiffs’ claims are not
predicated on "a requirement or prohibition based on
smoking or health." The Maine statute on which
plaintiffs’ action rests does not operate on the basis of,
or even refer to, smoking or health. Nor is there any
contention that the Maine legislature enacted its anti-
fraud statute based on the health consequences of
smoking. Compare Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525,547 (2001) (striking down billboard ordinance
because it "expres sly target [ed] cigarette advertising").
Plaintiffs’ fraud claims are instead based on Maine’s
general duty not to deceive consumers about material
facts. These are precisely the claims that Cipollone
held were not subject to preemption under the
Labeling Act.
Petitioners and their amici have no answer to this
argument, other than to take aim at Cipollone. They
argue for a reading of the phrase ’%ased on smoking
and health" that would cut off all state fraud claims --
even those based on generally applicable legal
¯ requirements -- so long as there is an arguable nexus
between the allegedly fraudulent statements and
smoking and health. That argument fails for at least
two reasons.
18
First, it overlooks the fact that Congress did
nothing in 1965 or 1970 to regulate the content of
cigarette advertising; it simply mandated warning
labels on cigarette packages and later on
advertisements. The Labeling Act did not address
anything else about the advertising practices of the
cigarette makers. Had Congress wanted to vest the
FTC with exclusive j~arisdiction to regulate cigarette
advertising and premotion, as petitioners appear to
contend, it could have done so, but did not.
Nonetheless, petitioners would have this Court
conclude that Congress, which did not even require
warnings on cigarette advertising until 1985, intended
to render the states powerless to respond to even the
most patently misleading and fraudulent cigarette ads,
no matter how little the FTC chose to do under its
general powers to police unfair and deceptive
advertising. There is simply no basis for inferring that
Congress intended to give cigarette companies a
license to deceive. See Puerto Rico De.pt. of Consumer
Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503
(1988) (finding no intent to preempt field that Congress
has left unregulated); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996) (construing a general
preemption provision to apply only "where a particular
state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific
federal interest").~
~ This point takes on particular force here, given the
long-standing collaboration between the FTC and the states
in consumer protection matters. As discussed below, see
Part II.C., infra, at the time Congress enacted the Labeling
(continued...)
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Second, the construction of the Labeling Act urged
by Philip Morris and its amici leads to palpably
absurd results, which they ignore. Under their reading
of the Act,. Philip Morris is free to place any health
claim on labels, in advertising, in press releases, in
government submissions, and in other public
statements, no matter how false, deceptive,
misleading, or far-fetched. In their view, so long as
there is an arguable nexus between a state law claim
and smoking and health, no state can take any action
to force cigarette companies to stop deceiving their
customers.
To see the breath-taking scope of Philip Morris’
argument, assume that Philip Morris were to make the
following claims about Marlboro Lights: "Smoking
helps you lose weight;" "Smoking fights Parkinson’s
Disease," and"Smoking wards off depression." Assume
as well that each of these claims is false and that many
consumers purchased and smoked Marlboro Lights to
obtain these illusory benefits. Under Philip Morris’
theory, state law claims alleging deliberate
misrepresentation and fraud, even if brought by a
State Attorney General under a general anti-fraud
statute like Maine’s, would be preempted because
those claims would seek to impose a state law
7(...continued)
Act it was well aware of the cooperative relationship
between the FTC and the states. Yet petitioners’ reading
would eliminate any role for the state in policing fraud and
deceptive conduct in the advertising and promotion of
cigarettes.
20
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health relating to the promotion of Marlboro Lights~
There is no limiting principle to this argument, and
these examples are j~Lst the tip of an iceberg. Under
Philip Morris’ reading, the Labeling Act -- a statute
designed to ensure that the public is informed of the
risks of smoking -- becomes an instrument of
deception.
It was precisely this concern that led the Cipollone
plurality to draw thLe line where it did. As the
Cipollone plurality recognized, there is no reason,
either in the text or history of the Labeling Act, to
think that Congress. intended to shield cigarette
manufacturers from liability when they engage in
intentional fraud.
B. The Case Against Preemption Here is Even
More Compelling Than in Cipollone.
There is one crucial difference between this case
and Cipollone that makes the case against preemption
here even more compelling. In Cipollone, the essence
of the plaintiffs claim was that the tobacco companies,
through advertising and promotion, sought to minimize
or neutralize the hea]tlh warnings Congress required on
cigarette labels and advertising. 505 U.S. at 510. The
argument was that the tobacco companies were trying
to convey the message that smoking cigarettes is not as
hazardous as the government wants you to believe.
But with Marlboro Lights, and other "light"
cigarettes, the fraud claim is that "lighLt" cigarettes are
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named, designed, and promoted to take advantage of
the public’s response to health warnings. As explained
above, light cigarettes like Marlboro Lights were
created to capitalize on the fears of smokers and to
induce them not to quit by persuading them that
"light" cigarettes offer a less dangerous alternative to
regular cigarettes. It is no coincidence that Marlboro
Lights were introduced in 1971, just when the new
warnings were being placed on labels and advertising.
United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 338-
39, 477-81, 516-17. In designing and promoting
Marlboro Lights, Philip Morris’ strategy was not to
neutralize or minimize the warnings. Instead, it was
to tell a public, now informed of the risks of smoking
that, whatever health risks regular cigarettes may
pose, "light" cigarettes are different because they pose
less of a health risk, reduce dependence on tobacco, are
an alternative to quitting, and are socially acceptable.
Id.
As a result, in this case (as in other "light" cases)
plaintiffs argue that Philip Morris engaged in
fraudulent and deceptive acts that fall outside the
preemptive scope of the Labeling Act. These
fraudulent acts include: (a) designing light cigarettes
to deliver comparable quantities of nicotine and tar as
regular cigarettes, but to deliver lower amounts when
machine-tested, (b) using false health descriptors like
"Light" to persuade smokers that they receive less tar
and nicotine than from other cigarettes, (c) concealing
evidence showing Marlboro Lights are just as deadly as
other cigarettes, and (d) making statements to the
public, to the press, to public health agencies, and to
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Congress and other legislative bodies promoting the
understanding that "light" cigarettes are safer while
concealing evidence that proves that the statements
are false. See Good, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 144 & n.21
(summarizing complaint). These actions, which
amount to intentional fraud on Philip Morris’ part, are
plainly beyond the preemptive reach of the Labeling
Act. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529. For this reason
too, petitioners’ express preemption argument should
be rejected.
C. The Text of t.he Labeling Act Refutes
Petitioners’Open-Ended Reading.
Even if this Colart is inclined to reexamine
Cipollone, notwithsta~ading the stare decisis force of a
sixteen-year-old statutory interpretation decision, the
outcome of which was supported by seven Justices, see,
e.g., John R. Sand &,Gravel Co. v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 750, 756 (2008), and reaffirmed seven years ago
in Reilly, see 553 U.S. at 549-50, the result should
remain the same. The text of Section 1334(b) confirms
the correctness of the Cipollone plurality’s ruling that
the phrase "no reqt~irement or prohibition based on
smoking and health" is not open-ended, but is a term
of limitation. There are two related points, in addition
to those detailed above, that demonstrate the error in
petitioners’ argument.
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1. Petitioners’Motivation-Based Reading of the Act
Is Contrary to its Text and Structure.
Petitioners argue that, in determining whether a
state requirement is based on smoking and health, the
preemption question should turn on the State’s motive
in imposing the requirements, or even on the plaintiffs’
motive in bringing the litigation, rather than on the
character of the requirement itself. See, e.g., Br. at 23.
Thus, in petitioners’ view, if a State’s requirement was
in any way motivated by the relationship between
smoking and health, then it is preempted because the
State seeks to "impose" a "requirement" "based on
smoking and health." Id. at 23-25.
The text and structure of Section 1334(b) refute
petitioners’ motive-based interpretation. They make
clear that the phrase "based on smoking and health"
modifies "requirement or prohibition," not "imposed;"
that is, the state law requirement must be based on
smoking and health for the preemption provision to
kick in. The phrase is therefore most naturally read as
referring to the objective character of the requirement
or prohibition itself, not on the subjective reasons
underlying the adoption of the State requirement at
issue. If Congress had intended to require a motive-
based inquiry, as petitioners contend, it would have
located the phrase referring to smoking and health so
that it modified "imposed" rather than "requirement or
prohibition," and would have used words other than
’’based on" (such as "because of’ or "on account of’
smoking and health).
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The contrast between this case and Reilly
illustrates this point. In Reilly, the Court upheld a
preemption challenge to state "regulations governing
the advertising and sale of cigarettes." 533 U.S. at
532. The Court so held because regulations that
"expressly target cigarette advertising" "squarely
contradictS" the Labeling Act. Id. at 547, 550. In
contrast, Reilly observed, that "States remain free" to
enact restrictions "that apply to cigarettes on equal
terms with other products" because" ’[s]uch restrictions
are not ’based on smoking and health,"’ but are instead
based on general requirements that apply equally to
all consumer products. Id. This is just such a case.
Petitioners’ construction also stretches "based on
smoking and healtb~" beyond its breaking point,
transforming a term. of limitation into a term of
inclusion. Under petitioners’ reading, almost any
requirement or prohibition that a State might impose
"with respect to the, advertising or promotion of...
cigarettes" would have as its underlying motivation a
concern about the health consequences of smoking.
Interpreting "based on smoking and health" to refer to
the State’s underlying motivation for imposing a
requirement would, deprive that iphrase of any
significant limiting force. Even a general zoning
ordinance forbidding the placement of billboards
(including those promoting cigarettes) :near elementary
schools to protect impressionable school children would
likely fail petitioners’ :motive-based test. But see Reilly,
533 U.S. at 550. Th!is Court has ca~tioned against
interpreting a preemption provision in a manner that
fails to give significant force to "words of limitation."
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New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995).
Petitioners’ proposed interpretation suffers from that
vice.
2. Petitioners’Effort to Substitute "Relating To"for
"Based On" Should Also be Rejected.
Petitioners’ interpretation suffers from a second
vice. Although petitioners do not say so directly, they
seek to substitute the expansive term "relating to" for
the narrower "based on." One tell-tale sign of this
interpretive move is petitioners’ repeated reliance on
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228
(1995). Wolens involved preemption questions under
the Airline Deregulation Act, which, at the time, had
a preemption provision that said that no state "shall
enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or
other provision having the force and effect of law
relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier."
Id. at 222 (quoting 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1))
(emphasis added),s The Court construed the operative
phrase "relating to" to mean "having a connection with,
or reference to, airline ’rates, routes, or services."’ Id.
at 223 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 348 (1992)); see also Cal. Div. of Labor
Stds. Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316,
324 (1997) (giving similar reading to "relates to" under
Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
The provision now appears at 49 U.S.C. §
41713(b)(I).
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There is a vast difference between that broad test
of relatedness and the far more focused "based on"
language at issue here. The term "based on" or "based
upon" is generally used by Congress and this Court to
refer to the legal grounds for a claim. See, e.g., Merril!
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S.
71, 74, 82 (2006) (reviewing provision of the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 and stating
that "[n]o covered class action based upon the statutory
or common law of any State... may be maintained in
any State or Federal court by any private party,"
subject to certain exemptions) (emphasis added); Bates
v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S..431, 447 & n.22
(2005) (referring to claims ’’based on" fraud); Wolens,
513 U.S. at 233 (referring to a claim as one "based on
state law"); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 485 (1987)
(noting that the "demands for arbitration were based
on" agreement between the parties); Fid. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 149 (1982)
(describing claim as one "based on" contract clause).
As is clear, principles of ordinary usage counsel in
favor of giving the term "based on" its established
meaning -- that is, as a reference for the legal basis of
a complaint, not the sweeping construction petitioners
urge.
For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in
respondents’ more elaborate presentation of the issues,
petitioners’ express preemption claim fails.
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II. The FTC Has No "Policy" Regarding
Health Descriptors or "Low Tar" Claims.
Petitioners’ implied preemption argument rests on
the assertions that the FTC "authorized" use of health
descriptors like "light" and "low tar," and that the FTC
established a policy favoring "low tar" cigarettes that
would be impaired by permitting respondents’ claim to
proceed. The fatal defect in this argument is that it is
built on wishful thinking, not history. The simple fact
is that the FTC neither authorized Philip Morris to use
"light" as a product descriptor nor established the "low
tar" policy on which Philip Morris’ argument hinges.
That is not just our view; it is also the position of the
United States. See Brief of the United States in United
States v. Philip Morris, at 149-169.    Because
permitting respondents’ claim to go forward would
impair no federal policy, there is no basis for Philip
Morris’ implied preemption claim.
Amici leave it ~o respondents to review the history
of the FTC’s oversight of the cigarette industry to
show. point-by-point, why Philip Morris’ argument
cannot be reconciled with the facts. But there are
three points that merit emphasis.
A. Philip Morris Defrauded the FTC as Well as the
Public.
Philip Morris’ fraud extended to the FTC, which is
why the United States has focused much of its fire in
U.S.v. Philip Morris on Philip Morris’ fraud relating to
"light" cigarettes. See id. at 47-55, 130-32, 146-70,
202-04. The record in that case shows that on virtually
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every issue relating to the design, testing and
marketing of "light" cigarettes, Philip Morris and other
companies deceived ~he FTC, as well as the public.
The record is unequivocal on this point, as just a
few illustrations demonstrate.
* Philip Morris and other companies knew all
about the behavior "light" cigarette smokers engage in
to ensure that they maintain their intake of nicotine.
United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 456,
461-67, 477-81, 488. This behavior, known as
"compensation," includes taking deeper and more
frequent puffs and holding the cigarette in a way that
closes air holes that would otherwise dilute the smoke.
Id. None of Philip Morris’ evidence on compensation
was furnished to the FTC. Id. at 504. Making matters
worse, Philip Morris deliberately misrepresented the
evidence on compensation in its submissions to the
FTC. Id. at 500-04. For example, in 1998, Philip
Morris and other cigarette companies filed public
comments in response to an FTC inquiry about
whether changes should be made to the "Cambridge
Filter Method" of testing.. Id. at 503-04.. Philip Morris
and the other companies sought to dissuade the FTC
from taking action, arguing that the evidence on
compensatory behavior "is highly equivocal" and so
sparse that consumers should not even. "be alerted to
its existence." Id.
* Philip Morris also knew, but concealed, the
serious flaws in the Cambridge Filter Method of
assessing the tar and nicotine delivered to the smoker.
Id. at 465-68. Indeed, Philip Morris had determined in
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the mid-1960s that the Cambridge Filter Method was
so flawed that it developed a "Human Smoker
Simulator" that allowed the company to duplicate
"exactly the smoking behavior of a given individual
with a given cigarette." Id. at 464-65. Philip Morris
concealed this testing advance from the FTC. Id.
* Philip Morris also sought to stave off FTC
regulation of the use of descriptors like "light, .... ultra
light," and "low tar." At the same time the agency
sought comments on the Cambridge Method, it asked
whether there was a "need for official guidance" with
respect to these descriptors. 62 Fed Reg. 48,158,
48.163 (1997). Philip Morris denied that there was
such a need. United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F.
Supp. 2d at 511-12.
These illustrations drive home that Philip Morris
was not trying to deceive just the public, it was also
trying to ward off consumer-protective regulation by
deceiving the FTC. Under these circumstances, Philip
Morris’ claim that the FTC "authorized" its fraudulent
acts is nothing short of audacious.
2. Philip Morris" Own Statements Refute the
Existence of a FTC "Policy. ’"
Apart from its efforts to deceive the FTC, Philip
Morris has also made public statements that refute its
FTC-authorization argument. For instance, as noted
above, in 1997 the FTC observed that a presidential
panel of experts had concluded that "[b]rand names
and brand classifications such as ’light’ and ’ultra light’
represent health claims and should be regulated and
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accompanied, in fair balance, with an appropriate
disclaimer." 62 Fed. Reg. at 48,163. The FTC then
asked whether "there [is] a need for c,fficial guidance
with respect to the terms used in marketing lower
rated cigarettes? If yes, why? If no, w]hy not?" Id. In
response, Philip Morris and other companies rejected
the FTC’s suggestion, contending that, they "were not
convinced that there is a need for official guidance with.
respect to the terms used in marketing" "light"
cigarettes. United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp.
2d at 511-12. Not only does the FTC’s query
demonstrate that, in i~s view, it had never authorized
descriptors, but Philip Morris’ response shows that it
sought to dissuade the FTC from even giving guidance
on the marketing of "light" and "low tar" cigarettes.
Philip Morris confirmed its understanding that the
FTC had not authorized use of health descriptors just
a few years later¯ In 2002, it filed a petition with the
FTC asking the agency "to promulgate rules governing
¯ . . the use of descriptors, such as ’light’ and ’ultra
light."’ See Good, 501 F.3d at 56 n.29. Of course, had
the FTC already authorized the use of descriptors,
Philip Morris’ petition would not have been necessary.
3. The FTC’s Jurisdiction over Fraud in the
Marheting of Cigarettes is not Exclusive.
Not only is Philip Morris’ FTC-authorization
argument belied by its own actions, but it also
overlooks a key point: the FTC does not have exclusive
jurisdiction to police fraud in the marketing and
promotion of cigarettes. Congress did not intend for
the FTC to "occupy the field" of consumer protection,
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and state law unfair and deceptive practices claims are
not preempted unless they conflict with FTC
regulations. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767
F.2d at 989-90; see also Holloway v. Bristol-Myers
Corp., 485 F.2d 957, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Indeed,
because of the overlap between the FTC’s authority
and state and local consumer protection laws, Congress
amended the FTC Act in 1975 to require the FTC to
engage in rulemaking in order to preempt state law.
These procedures, which go beyond those required by
the APA, compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 with 15 U.S.C. §§
57a(a)(2)-(b)(1), were designed to provide notice to the
states and "to ensure the preemption decision will be
carefully made." Paul R. Verkuil, Preemption of State
Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 Duke L.J.
225, 243.
The amendments are quite explicit that the FTC
must use its rulemaking authority to preempt state
law. Section 57(a)(2) of the Act now provides that
"It]he Commission shall have no authority under this
Act, other than its authority under this section, to
prescribe any rule with respect to unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the
meaning of section 5(a)(1))." As a result of these
amendments, there is general agreement that, for the
FTC to preempt state law, it must engage in
rulemaking following the procedures set forth in the
1975 amendments. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n,
767 F.2d at 989-90 & n.41; Katharine Gibbs Sch. v.
FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 667 (2d Cir. 1979).
Petitioners’ implied preemption argument fails for
this reason as well. Even if, as Philip Morris claims,
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the FTC’s actions here amount to a "policy" and they
do not -- that would not be sufficient to find
preemption. Congres~,~ has required the FTC to engage
in rulemaking in order to preempt State law. The FTC
has not done so here. In the face of an unmistakable
congressional mandate about how an agency must
exercise its preemptive authority, the agency’s failure
to do so necessarily drains its actions of preemptive
effect.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in respondents’
brief, the judgment below should be affirmed.
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